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INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARISON OF THE
UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
SYNOPSIS
“Works of art are the property of mankind and ownership carries
with it the obligation to preserve them.  He who neglects this
duty . . . will be punished with the contempt of all educated people,
now and in future ages.”—Attributed to J.W. von Goethe1
“Much of what they want to commercialize is sacred to us.  We see
intellectual property as part of our culture.  It cannot be separated
into categories, as [Western] lawyers would want.”—North Ameri-
can Indian Congress, Ray Apoaka2
“The indigenous view of the world . . . is the antithesis to the West-
ern paradigm: communitarian, not individual, focused on sharing
rather than shielding things, respect for land and all living things as
sacred rather than as objects ripe for exploitation and consump-
tion.”3
These statements illustrate a fundamental tension between indi-
vidualist, or “Romantic,” views of property rights typically associated
with Western thought, and the communal view of property rights held
by indigenous peoples.  Goethe’s view of works of art is in keeping
with the “Romantic” view of authorship, a perception that highly val-
ues the individual experience of artistic production.4  The traditional
Copyright © 2002 by Rachael Grad
1. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 35 (1999).
2. DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
TOWARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES 121 (1996) (quoting remarks at a seminar on intellectual property rights at the
U.N. Human Rights Convention in Vienna, June 1993).
3. Siegfried Wiessner, Symposium, Introduction in Sixth Annual Tribe Sovereignty Sym-
posium, Defending Indigenous Peoples’ Heritage, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 271, 272 (2001).
4. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,”
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (1991) (“During the eighteenth century, ‘authorship’ became inti-
mately associated with the Romantic movement in literature and art, expressing ‘an extreme
assertion of the self and the value of individual experience . . . together with the sense of the in-
finite and the transcendental.’”) (citing THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLIGH LITERATURE
842 (M. Drabble ed., 5th ed. 1985)); Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to
Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 179–84
(2000).  See generally James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Fram-
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indigenous view, in contrast, envisions property, knowledge and na-
ture as part of an interconnected world.5
Indigenous concerns are common throughout the world.  What
qualifies as an “indigenous” concern?  The United Nations (UN) de-
fines indigenous peoples according to three general characteristics.6
First, indigenous peoples have a historical continuity with the socie-
ties that developed in particular territories before they were con-
quered or colonized.  Second, they consider themselves to be a dis-
tinct and non-dominant sector of the present society of the territory.
Third, they are “determined to preserve, develop and transmit to fu-
ture generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity,
as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance
with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal sys-
tems.”7
The UN’s definition provides a starting point for analyzing in-
digenous concerns.  But it should be kept in mind that other factors
are also relevant.  For example, a 1993 International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO)8 report revealed that, as compared to national popula-
tions, the world’s indigenous people have higher rates of infant mor-
tality, unemployment, alcoholism, disease, ill health, and
incarceration.9  Sadly, as a general rule, “indigenous and tribal peo-
ples are always, always at the bottom of the social and economic
heaps.”10
The historical backgrounds and unique characteristics of indige-
nous people require and justify special protection.11  Can intellectual
ers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625 (1998) (providing a discussion of the “romantic conception of the
author”).
5. Riley, supra note 4, at 190.
6. Jose R. Martinez-Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous
Populations, ¶¶ 379–81, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and the Protection of Minorities (1986); U.N. ESCOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1987) (Vol. V, Conclusions, Proposals
and Recommendations).
7. Id.
8. The ILO, founded in 1919, is a specialized agency under the auspices of the United Na-
tions.  Its stated mission is to promote international human and labor rights.  See ILO website,
http://www.ilo.org/public/ english/about/index.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
9. Robin Wright, World’s Indigenous Peoples Are the Poorest, Study Says, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 13, 1993, at A21.
10. Id. (quoting Michel Hansenne, ILO Director-General).
11. See Debating Activities of International Decade of World’s Indigenous People, Third
Committee Hears Calls for Sharper Definition of ‘Indigenous,’ reprinted in G.A. Press Release,
U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3595 (17 Oct. 2000).
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property rights help rectify this problem?  This paper addresses this
essential question by analyzing and comparing the divergent legal sys-
tems of the United States and Australia.  Although these legal re-
gimes faced similar requirements relative to indigenous populations,
they have responded quite differently.  In this article I will closely ex-
amine the United States and Australia’s diverging legal developments
in order to illuminate the underlying factors that may shape legal re-
sponses in the future.  Part I will compare and contrast the respective
legal systems of the United States and Australia.  Part II will identify
key legal decisions from each of these countries and will analyze them
with respect to the “individualist” and the indigenous, communal
view of intellectual property.  Part III will consider certain interna-
tional approaches to indigenous intellectual property rights, and will
compare this to U.S. and Australian experiences.  Finally, Part IV will
propose how the heritage and culture of indigenous peoples can in-
deed be preserved through expanded intellectual property rights.
I.  DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS: THE LEGAL REGIMES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
In certain respects, the United States and Australia share similar
colonial histories.  For example, indigenous peoples originally popu-
lated both countries, and both countries were colonized by the Eng-
lish.  However, the legal systems in these two countries have dealt
with indigenous rights in divergent ways.  In general, the United
States has always accorded recognition to its tribal peoples while Aus-
tralia has not.  The United States has a rich history of legal recogni-
tion of indigenous rights to land, but Australia has only considered
the subject during the past few decades.  The differing experiences of
U.S. and Australian legal regimes are suggestive of the wide diversity
among the various national approaches of countries with indigenous
residents.12
Some implications of this divergence may be illustrated by com-
paring contrasting approaches to rights in land.  During the 1990s, a
major concern of indigenous peoples involved the reclamation of
12. Karen E. Bravo, Balancing Indigenous Rights to Land and the Demands of Economic
Development: Lessons from the U.S. and Australia, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 529, 534
(1997).  Indigenous concerns are similar among aboriginal and native communities throughout
the world, but the national approaches to these concerns differ greatly among the countries
where indigenous peoples reside.  Id.
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autonomous control over traditional lands.13  Indigenous peoples are
concerned with protecting land as a means of protecting their culture.
Land ownership is “intertwined with the ideal of self-determination
of indigenous peoples, along with their ability to choose the extent of
their participation in the lives of the nations that have grown up
around them, their ability to preserve their unique cultural heritage
without outside interference, and their ability to choose the lifestyles
that they desire.”14
A. Recognition of the Legal Status of the Indigenous Population in
the United States
In the 18th century settlers in the United States made various
treaties with the Indian tribes.  The Northwest Ordinance of July 13,
1787 stated: “[t]he utmost good faith shall always be observed to-
wards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from
them without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty
they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful
wars authorized by Congress.”15  The U.S. Constitution has a specific
Indian Commerce Clause: “The Congress shall have the Power . . . .
[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States and with the Indian Tribes.”16  The Trade and Intercourse Act
of 179017 made clear that only the federal government could authorize
trade with the Native American Nations: “No person shall be permit-
ted to carry on any trade or intercourse with the Indian tribes, with-
out a license of that purpose under the hand and seal of . . . such . . .
person as the President of the United States shall appoint for that
purpose.”18
As the United States grew in strength, legislation and case law
slowly evolved.  Both areas of law recognized simultaneously that Na-
tive Americans had been conquered and subjugated, and that this
subjugation should or would be continued.  The United States origi-
nally recognized the independence of indigenous peoples and treated
them as foreign nations.19  In 1832, the Supreme Court stated that,
13. Id. at 531–32.
14. Id. at 532.
15. Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, art. III.
16. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
17. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
18. Id. § 1.
19. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
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“America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by
a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each
other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own,
and governing themselves by their own laws.”20  This case also recog-
nizes that the United States must honor treaties with indigenous peo-
ples.21
Yet, in the same year, Justice John Marshall explicitly recognized
the doctrine of discovery used to legitimize the taking of Native
American land:22
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of
Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as
they could respectively acquire.  Its vast extent offered an ample
field to the ambition and enterprise of all; and the character and
religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them
as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim
an ascendancy.  The potentates of the old world found no difficulty
in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to
the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and
Christianity, in exchange for unlimited independence.  But, as they
were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in
order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with
each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as
the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted,
should be regulated as between themselves.  This principle was,
that discovery gave title . . . .23
At the time of this case, in 1823, Indian tribes were still granted
“unlimited independence.”  However, the independence of Indian
tribes was rapidly diminished and, within less than a decade, indige-
nous people were demoted to the status of domestic dependent na-
tions.24  Congress’ decision to pass laws affecting the native tribes con-
tributed to this loss of independence and to the decline in Indian
tribal sovereignty.25
From 1845 to 1887, the federal government forced Indians onto
reservations.26  By 1886, when the Marshall Court formally ruled on
the relationship between Native Americans and the federal govern-
20. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542–43 (1832).
21. Id.
22. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
23. Id. at 572–73.
24. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 12, 13 (1831).
25. SHIN IMAI, ABORIGINAL LAW HANDBOOK 116 (2d ed.) (1999).
26. Amy Sender, Note, Australia’s Example of Treatment Towards Native Title: Indigenous
People’s Land Rights in Australia and the U.S., 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 521, 540–41 (1999).
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ment in United States v. Kagama,27 U.S. military actions against the
tribes had significantly reduced tribal land holdings.  While Native
American tribes lost their status as sovereign nations in the late 18th
century, Native Americans did not become citizens of the United
States until the passage of the Citizenship Act in 1924.28  Before the
Act’s passage, Congress selectively extended citizenship to some Na-
tive Americans by treaty and statute.  Because indigenous peoples
were not U.S. citizens, no constitutional provisions directly addressed
indigenous land or any other indigenous rights.
In fact, since tribal councils in the United States were exempted
from the Bill of Rights, Native Americans were not given the same
protection as other U.S. residents.  Until 1968, the Bill of Rights was
not applied to Native Americans.  The 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act29
requires tribal governments to abide by the individual rights of the
Bill of Rights.30  However, tribal councils are not permitted to operate
wholly independently through tribal court.  The U.S. Supreme Court
technically cannot hear such cases stemming from tribal court pro-
ceedings, absent exceptional circumstances.  However, the Supreme
Court has consistently relied on a special federal responsibility to na-
tive peoples, described as the “unique obligation” of Congress to In-
dians as a suspect racial class under constitutional theory, to supervise
Native Americans.31
Heightened constitutional protection of Indians has not allevi-
ated the suffering of American indigenous peoples.  This is becoming
more apparent as the indigenous population grows.  According to the
1990 census, 1,878,285 persons identified themselves as American In-
dians.  This is an increase from 523,591 in 1960, and a great increase
from the population of 1980.32  Despite its growth, the American In-
dian population suffers disproportionately compared to the general
27. 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (affirming Congressional power to assert criminal jurisdiction over
Native Americans in their territories).
28. Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994).
29. 82 Stat. 77 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (1994)).
30. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 38 (1995).
31. Gillian Triggs, The Rights of “Peoples” and Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony?, in
THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 151 (J. Crawford ed., 1988).
32. Joanne Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity,
60 AM. SOC. REV. 947, 947–51 (1995).  Nagel’s sociological study attributes this increase to the
combination of three factors: “federal Indian policy, American ethnic politics, and American
Indian political activism.”  Id.
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population.  Thirty-one percent of the total American Indian popula-
tion and 51% of Indians residing on reservations live below the pov-
erty level, compared to only 13% of the total U.S. population.33  In
1997, of the 554 federally recognized tribes, 306 tribes (55%) are de-
fined as small and needy, meaning with 1,500 or fewer members, and
without sufficient funds to operate without further federal support.34
The 1998 “Report of the President’s Initiative on Race, Changing
America,” stated “the indigenous people of this Nation continue to
suffer disproportionately in relation to any other group.” 35  Despite
the increased number of people identifying themselves as indigenous,
“they have become America’s most invisible minority.”36
B. Recognition of the Legal Status of the Indigenous Population in
Australia
As in the United States, there is an upward trend in the number
of Australians identifying themselves as indigenous.  Estimates put
the Aboriginal population between 1911 and 1966 at 80,000 to
100,000.37  The census of 1981 showed 159,897,38 and the 1996 census
showed 386,000, up 55% from 1986.39  During this time, the overall
population growth in Australia was only 12%.40  The national surge in
the indigenous population is explained by “a greater willingness on
the part of people with mixed ancestry to declare their heritage, as
opposed to an indigenous baby boom.”41  This willingness to identify
with the indigenous community has grown in recent years due to Aus-
tralia’s “increasing action to enhance [the] status and rights of indige-
nous people in the community.”42
Despite recent improvements in status, Australia’s aboriginals
have suffered a long and painful history.  Until recently, aboriginals in
33. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and
International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 65 (Spring 1999).
34. Id.
35. Martin E. Andersen, Native American Rights, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1999, at A19.
36. Id.
37. Wiessner, supra note 33, at 74 (citing Claire Miller, Indigenous Numbers Increase By
55%, in THE AGE, June 4, 1998).
38. Id. (citing Garth Nettheim, Australian Aborigines and the Law, 2 L.R. ANTHROP’Y 371
(1987)).
39. Id. (citing Miller, supra note 37).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Australia had no legal title to land.43  In 1788, Captain Cook claimed
sovereignty of the territory in the name of Britain.  Aboriginal lands
in Australia were acquired on the basis of a terra nullius doctrine,
meaning that the land belonged to no one and the European settlers
gained the title to the land by discovering it.  Under terra nullius, the
indigenous habitants of Australia had no recognized sovereignty or
laws.  The English common law was imposed on them, forcing them
to give up their land without treaties or compensation.44  In contrast
to the United States, New Zealand45 and Canada,46 Australia was the
only English colony that lacked treaties with its indigenous peoples.47
Due to their lack of treaty rights, Australian aboriginals had the few-
est rights and worst conditions of any of these countries.48
43. Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1.
44. Wiessner, supra note 33, at 72.
45. The legal rights of indigenous peoples in New Zealand revolve around the Treaty of
Waitangi, signed on Feb. 6, 1840, between the British Crown and the Maori Peoples of New
Zealand.  Interpretations of the Treaty have varied according to public opinion.  In 1878, the
court in Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington stated,
the Maori tribes were incapable of performing the duties and therefore assuming the
rights of a civilised community . . .  so far as it is purported to cede sovereignty[.]  [The
Treaty] must be regarded as a simple nullity.  No body politic existed capable of mak-
ing cession of sovereignty, nor could such a thing itself exist.
3 NZ Jurist (N.S.) SC 72, 78.  More recently the Treaty of Waitangi has been acknowledged as
giving indigenous peoples the right to self-determination.
To fail to recognize Maori as ‘peoples’ entitled to self-determination is to deny their
inherent rights as an indigenous people; it is to deny the guarantees given in the Treaty
of Waitangi; it is to deny the rich and ancient tapestry of Maori culture that has en-
dured in this country [New Zealand] for a thousand years.  It is also to deny their right
to preserve, practise and enhance their culture in accordance with their own customary
laws.
Maui Solomon, The Context for Maori (II), in RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 65–66 (Alison Quentin-Baxter ed., 1998).
46. Treaties with aboriginal peoples made with the British Crown, before the Confedera-
tion of Canada, were considered treaties with the Canadian Crown after Confederation.  See
THOMAS ISAAC, ABORIGINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 99 (1995).  The
British Crown recognized North American Indian nations as self-governing by stating,
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest . . . that the several
Nations or Tribes of Indians . . . should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession
of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or pur-
chased by Us, are reserved to them . . . as their Hunting Grounds—We do there-
fore . . . declare . . . that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any of our Colo-
nies . . . do presume, upon any Pretence whatever, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass
any Patents for Lands beyond the Bounds of their respective Governments.
Royal Proclamation of Oct. 7, 1763, R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No. 1, id. at 6.
47. Wiessner, supra note 33, at 72.
48. In August 1999, the Australian Parliament passed a motion of reconciliation expressing
deep and sincere regret over injustices suffered by indigenous peoples.  Nonetheless, Prime
Minister John Howard stressed the importance of national unity as the reason for not signing a
treaty with indigenous peoples (a treaty would create two distinct nations).  Rights of Indige-
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Until 1967, Aborigines were constitutionally excluded from the
Commonwealth government.49  In a 1967 constitutional referendum,
92% of Australians voted in favor of removing the discriminatory
provision.50  This gave the Commonwealth government power to leg-
islate aboriginal affairs.51  As late as 1975, courts in Australia affirmed
the doctrine that all Australian land “[belonged] to the Crown until
the Crown chose to grant it.”52  In 1976, the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act was passed.  The Act recognizes traditional
claims to land in the Northern Territory based on spiritual ties.  The
1989 Lands Acquisition Act allows the Australian government to
compel the sale of land to meet native claims.
In 1992, under Mabo, the notion of terra nullius was overruled
and native title to land was finally recognized in Australia.53  The
court in Mabo concluded “the common law of this country recognizes
a form of native title which, in the cases where it has not been extin-
guished, reflects the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in ac-
cordance with their laws and customs, to their traditional lands.”54  In
another recent case, Wik v. Queensland,55 the court extended this doc-
trine to hold that pastoral leases did not extinguish Native title.
The courts have not been the sole mechanism for improving in-
digenous rights.  The 1993 Native Title Act56 established a method to
determine whether Native title exists over particular areas of land or
water, and addressed claims of compensation.  The National Native
Title Tribunal administers the Act, which is a negotiating, mediating
and research body whose determinations are not binding.  However,
the Federal Court of Australia decides contested aboriginal claims
and the state still has authority to decide matters of indigenous title
and rights.
nous People Transcend Question of Land Ownership Australia Tells Social Committee, U.N.
Press Release, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3542 (1999).
49. The Commonwealth government in Australia is equivalent to the U.S. federal govern-
ment.
50. See MARC GUMBERT, NEITHER JUSTICE NOR REASON: A LEGAL AND
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS 23 (1984).
51. Id.
52. The Seas and Submerged Lands Case, New South Wales v. The Commonwealth, (1975)
135 C.L.R. 336, 438–39 (quoting Williams’ Case, (1913) 16 C.L.R.I. at 37).
53. (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1.
54. Id. at 2.
55. (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129.
56. Native Title Act, 1993 (Austl.).
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The Australian government’s power to determine aboriginal is-
sues has been harshly criticized.  The recognition of the existence of
indigenous law in Mabo was groundbreaking, but limited since “it was
confined to land tenure rather than Indigenous law generally; it ac-
cepted the ability of Indigenous law to be overborne and displaced by
colonial law; and it forced Indigenous claimants into framing their en-
titlements in only those terms and concepts accepted by the dominant
legal system.”57  Another critic demonstrates how “White” principles
of justice, applied in Mabo and Wik and subsequently enshrined in
the Native Title Act, force indigenous peoples into satisfying “White”
rules:
Tragically and ironically, even though we were dispossessed of our
lands by White people, the burden of proof for repossession of our
lands is now placed on us, and it must be demonstrated in accor-
dance with the White legal structure in courts controlled by pre-
dominantly White men.  As the written word is generally regarded
as more realistic by courts, all claimants must be able to substanti-
ate their oral histories with documents written by White people
such as explorers, public servants, historians, lawyers, anthropolo-
gists and police . . . . Whiteness is centred by setting the criteria for
proof and the standards for credibility.58
Although rapid progress has been made in Australia in recent
years, legal procedures could be improved to better serve indigenous
peoples in Australia.  In deciding Mabo, the High Court stated that
Australia’s legal treatment towards indigenous peoples “should nei-
ther be nor seen to be frozen in as an age of racial discrimination.”59
The Court encouraged the use of comparisons between Australia’s
laws and those of other countries: “Australia can use Mabo to make a
clean break with the past and learn from the successes and failures of
countries sharing a significant cultural and legal bond.”60  Recent
copyright cases involving indigenous claims illustrate that Australia
has done so.
57. Janet Ransley and Elena Marcetti, The Hidden Whiteness of Australian Law: A Case
Study, 10 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW 139, 144 (2001).
58. Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Witnessing Whiteness in the Wake of Wik, 17 SOCIAL
ALTERNATIVES 11 (1998).
59. (1992) 107 A.L.R. at 28.
60. Gary D. Meyers & John Mugambwa, The Mabo Decision: Australian Aboriginal Land
Rights in Transition, 23 ENVTL. L. 1203, 1240 (1993).
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II.  COMPARISON OF RELEVANT U.S. AND
AUSTRALIAN CASE LAW
Cases involving indigenous and intellectual property rights are
ideal subjects for comparative analysis.  Indigenous and intellectual
property issues cross national borders, making them international in
scope, structure and importance.61  Further, intellectual property, by
its very nature, is well suited to a comparative approach: “recent de-
velopments in international intellectual property litigation demand an
intensified commitment to comparative work . . . . [T]he acceptance
that courts might apply foreign copyright law introduces the potential
for comparative analysis to play its most practical role of supplying
information about foreign law.”62
The scholar Basil Markesinis encourages the comparative case
method, in particular, for cross-country analysis.  While Markesinis
compares torts cases in Europe, his framework is helpful for making
case comparisons between Australia and the United States.  He ex-
plains:
I have always maintained that finding exact factual equivalents fa-
cilitates the teaching of foreign law and the receptions of foreign
ideas simply because it puts the foreign user of such material at
ease.  For, it takes him out of the theoretical and conceptual discus-
sion, which is appropriate to one system but not to another, and
puts him at a factual level where the similarity of the problems and
the answers can be tested in a very tangible way.  Often, the un-
derlying policies pursued by the different systems can also be easily
discovered hidden behind the conceptualism appropriate to each
system and shown to be the same across national borders.63
In explaining the case method analysis, Markesinis tries “to show
how, starting from decisions, we can come to appreciate the common
factual backgrounds and the remarkable similarity of solutions.”64
Studying foreign law through cases offers “a chance to compare judi-
cial styles, reflect on the sources of law and the use made of them by
various courts.”65  Markesinis’ analysis involves the use of cases to
61. As a result, indigenous peoples around the world face similar challenges due to the
shared experiences of colonization.  See Wiessner, supra note 3.
62. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for Re-
surgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 450–51 (2001).
63. Basil S. Markesinis, Foreign Law and Foreign Ideas in the English Courts, in ALWAYS
ON THE SAME PATH: ESSAYS ON FOREIGN LAW AND COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 2, 51
(2001).
64. Id. at 99.
65. Id.
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compare the similarities and differences between the systems, the in-
fluence of legal background on the outcome of these cases and the
different reasoning used by the courts in each country.66  Markesinis’
analysis concludes with a discussion on the utility of such a compara-
tive study.  In the following sections I will compare similar cases from
two different countries, altering Markesinis’ framework to include as-
pects of international law.  The cases described below demonstrate
differences in the approach to indigenous peoples’ rights in the
United States and Australia.  I will examine the similarities between
the cases and what they reveal about the countries’ attitudes towards
individual property rights and indigenous communal rights.  I will also
analyze the differing roles of the states in dealing with indigenous
rights through intellectual property interests.
A. United States Case Law
The American case Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson67 illustrates
the clash between the interests of the art market with those of the
Chilkat tribal community.  The case addresses the issues of communal
versus individual property rights in regard to cultural artifacts, and
the degree to which recognized tribes might impose their own cultural
preservation laws on non-members.
Chilkat involved religious and cultural artifacts of the Chilkat
tribe.  The artifacts were four carved wooden posts and a wood parti-
tion that art dealers and museums had repeatedly attempted to pur-
chase.  To the Chilkat tribe, the artifacts represent an irreplaceable
part of their cultural heritage that helps to maintain cultural identity.
The objects “mean[] a lot to people as far as their identity goes . . . .
You can’t go into a library and read about our history.  Every one of
the artifacts has a story to it.  It is our history.”68
The objects also have value to those not affiliated with the Chil-
kat tribe.  In the late 1870s, a U.S. naval officer, Lieutenant Emmons,
wrote “The Whale House of the Chilkat,” and described the artifacts
as “the finest example of Native art, either Tlingit or Tsimshian, in
Alaska.”69  Attempts to buy or steal the Whale House began shortly
66. Id. at 80–101.
67. 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989).
68. Dean Katz, Two Worlds Collide, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 9, 1984, at K1 (quoting Lani
Strong-Hotch).
69. GEORGE T. EMMONS, THE WHALE HOUSE OF THE CHILKAT (1916), reprinted in
RAVEN’S BONES 68, 81 (Andrew Hope III ed., 1982).
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after publication of Emmons’ paper.  These attempts were unsuccess-
ful until the appearance of the defendant, Michael R. Johnson, de-
scribed as “one of the world’s most respected Native American art
dealers.” 70  Johnson had been trying to buy the artifacts since the
early 1970s.71  He approached three elderly Whale House Group
women, caretakers of the artifacts, and offered them financial and le-
gal assistance to assert individual ownership rights over the artifacts.72
However, the tribe claimed that the artifacts were communal prop-
erty and, as such, could not be “owned” by the caretakers.73
Upon hearing that Johnson had reached a deal with one of the
elderly caretakers, Chilkat tribal members blocked the village road
and passed an ordinance forbidding the removal of cultural property
without tribal permission.  The ordinance stated:
No person shall enter on the property of the Chilkat Indian village
for the purpose of buying, trading for, soliciting the purchase of, or
otherwise seeking to arrange the removal artifacts, clan crests, or
other traditional Indian art work owned or held by members of the
Chilkat Indian Village or kept within the boundaries of the real
property owned by the Chilkat Indian Village, without first re-
questing and obtaining permission to do so from the Chilkat Indian
Village Council.  No traditional Indian artifacts, clan, crests, or
other Indian art works of any kind may be removed from the Chil-
kat Indian Village without the prior notification of and approval by,
the Chilkat Indian Village Council.74
Several tribal members later removed the artifacts from the Whale
House and shipped them to Johnson, who had arranged for their sale
to a New York art dealer.  The Chilkat Indian tribe sued to recover
the artifacts, claiming that Johnson violated the village ordinance and
federal law by removing Tlingit Native artifacts from the tribe’s land.
The court ruled against the Chilkat claims, holding that federal stat-
ues cannot give rise to private rights of action.75  The dissent wrote
70. Christopher S. Byren, Chilkat Indian Tribe v. Johnson and NAGRPA: Have We Finally
Recognized Communal Property Rights in Cultural Objects?, 8 J. ENV. L. & LITIG. 109, 114
(1993).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Chilkat, 870 F.2d 1469, 1471 (quoting Chilkat Indian Village, Alaska, Ordinance of
May 12, 1976).
75. Id. at 1476.
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that the court should imply a private remedy since Indian property
right claims have basis in federal law.76
The Chilkat controversy “represents a stark example of the con-
flicting values between tribes and the tribal art market, and reveals
the legal difficulties involved with recognizing a category of property
owned in perpetuity by an autonomous cultural group, inalienable by
individual group members.”77  The Chilkat valued the artifacts not for
their economic value but for their cultural and ceremonial value.
Neither the U.S. courts nor the federal Indian laws were able to
help the Chilkat reclaim their religious artifacts.  The Court showed
reluctance to rule on matters outside of its enumerated powers, par-
ticularly on matters concerning Native Americans.  Similarly, the
Court refused to rule on the validity of the tribal ordinance or to con-
sider communal property rights, as federal law does not recognize
them.  However sympathetic the Court may have been to Indian con-
cerns, it was powerless to rule outside of its jurisdiction.
B. Australian Case Law
Courts in Australia appear more prone than the American courts
to extend intellectual property rights to protect indigenous cultural
works.  Three famous Australian cases illustrate the increasing will-
ingness of this country’s courts to consider indigenous beliefs and val-
ues.
In Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, the Australian federal
court rejected a claim of communal harm caused by the unauthorized
use of sacred images.78  Representatives of the Galpu Clan sued to
prevent the Reserve Bank from reproducing the design of a Morning
Star Pole on a commemorative banknote.  A clan member who had
obtained his authority and knowledge through tribal initiation and
other sacred ceremonies created the pole.  The Galpu claimed that
the communal obligation of the artist to the tribe precluded him from
granting permission to an outside entity to replicate the pole in a cul-
turally offensive manner.  The court found that the artist had duly
transferred his intellectual property rights to the Reserve Bank
through a legally binding agreement.79  The court lamented that Aus-
76. Id.
77. Byren, supra note 70, at 116.
78. 21 I.P.R. 481, 492 (1991) (Austl.).
79. Id. at 490.
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tralian copyright law did not provide protection of the rights of the
aboriginal community as a whole to regulate the reproduction and use
of communal works.80  Courts in subsequent cases did more than just
lament; instead, these courts took a proactive approach to the law of
indigenous intellectual property rights.
In Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Party Ltd., aboriginal artists in Aus-
tralia sued to prevent the importation of carpets manufactured in
Vietnam by a company based in Perth.81  The carpets reproduced the
designs of several prominent aboriginal artists without their permis-
sion.  The designs had been copied from a portfolio of artworks pro-
duced by the Australian National Gallery.  In their argument, the
plaintiffs declared that: (1) they wanted to be compensated for their
original designs through a licensing arrangement; (2) they wanted to
exclude non-indigenous competitors from the market; (3) they
wanted to establish that such unauthorized use of intellectual prop-
erty violates not just the economic rights of the individual author, but
could potentially expose him to larger community sanctions, such as
the preclusion from the right to participate in ceremonies, removal of
the right to reproduce stories of the clan, and the expulsion from the
community, and (4) they required compensation for the communal
harm which resulted from the unauthorized use of aboriginal de-
signs.82
The federal court awarded the aboriginal artists damages for
copyright infringement and granted injunctions against further in-
fringement.83  The court acknowledged that the replication of the art-
work was commensurate with the pirating of cultural heritage and
furthermore, that the infringement of copyright could have far-
reaching effects given the cultural environment in which aborigines
live.84  Aboriginal sacred images had been used on carpet.  This prac-
tice was particularly offensive to the aboriginal people because carpet
is a medium for walking on, and its use is inconsistent with traditional
aboriginal cultural practices.  Ultimately, despite the culturally offen-
sive nature of the business activities, the court’s decision rested on
traditional copyright law.  Only the individual authors were compen-
sated, and not the greater aboriginal community.
80. Id.
81. 54 F.C.R. 240 (1994) (Austl.).
82. Id. at 241–43.
83. Id. at 272–83.
84. Id. at 283.
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The most recent case, Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles Party Ltd,
involved a leading aboriginal artist who was the legal owner of copy-
right in his own artwork.85  The defendant, R&T Textiles, imported
and sold fabric in Australia using Bulun Bulun’s designs, thus in-
fringing the aboriginal artist’s copyright.  The artist sued R&T Tex-
tiles for infringement of his copyright.
Another party in the case was Milpurrurru, an aboriginal artist,
who sued as a representative of the tribal people under the claim that
the tribal members were the equitable owners of the artwork’s copy-
right.86  Bulun Bulun was responsible for creating paintings in accor-
dance with the laws and rituals of the Ganalbingu people.  His paint-
ing depicted a waterhole that was the principle totemic well for this
artist’s clan.  Milpurrurru claimed that the unauthorized reproduction
of the image threatened the stability and continuance of the artist’s
role through its interference with the relationship between people,
their (creator) ancestors and the land given to them.  Furthermore, all
of the traditional owners of the Ganalbingu land would have to agree
on the use of artworks depicting a sacred site.  Bulun Bulun described
his position as artist within the tribal community:
My work is closely associated with an affinity for the land.  This af-
finity is the essence of my religious beliefs.  The unauthorized re-
production of art works is a very sensitive issue in all Indigenous
communities.  The impetus for the creation of works remains very
important in ceremonies and the creation of art works is an impor-
tant step in the preservation of important traditional custom.  It is
an activity which represents an important part of the culture; conti-
nuity of the tribe.  It is also the main source of income for my peo-
ple.87
The court found the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
Bulun Bulun and the Ganalbingu people that arose from the trust and
confidence of his people that his art would be made to preserve the
sacred sites, customs, culture and ritual knowledge of the Ganalbingu
peoples.88  Thus, the Australian legal system recognized the relation-
ship between the Ganalbingu tribe and Bulun Bulun as being of a fi-
duciary character arising from the law and customs of the tribe.
85. (1998) 157 ALR 193 (Austl.).
86. Id. at 210–12.
87. Cate Banks, The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same: The New Moral
Rights Legislation and Indigenous Creators, 9 GRIFFITH L. REV. 334, 338 (2000) (Austl.) (citing
an affidavit sworn by Johnny Bulun Bulun).
88. Bulun Bulun, supra note 85, at 210–11.
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These three cases show the most recent progression in the ability
of indigenous peoples in Australia to use the court system to protect
their intellectual property rights, particularly their copyrights.  These
prominent cases have moved Australian copyright law towards the
greater protection of indigenous rights and to an improvement in
mainstream Australia’s understanding of the cultures of aboriginal
people.89
III.  INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO
INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. International Legal Instruments
In recent years, the focus of international organizations has ex-
panded to include indigenous land claims and cultural rights.  The
self-determination of indigenous peoples is integral to asserting both
types of rights.  Self-determination of peoples is a generally accepted
rule of customary international law, referring to a collective rather
than an individual right.90  The right of self-determination has tradi-
tionally been asserted in the context of decolonization, and has been
used to advance a broad spectrum of political goals, including the
formation of new states.91  Without precisely defining the limits of the
principle, various international instruments recognize the right of self-
determination of peoples.92
89. Andrew T. Kenyon, Copyright, Heritage and Australian Aboriginal Art, 9 GRIFFITH L.
REV. 303 (2000).
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, art. 55.
91. Douglas Graham, The New Zealand Government’s Policy, in RECOGNIZING THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 3, 9 (Alison Quentin-Baxter ed., 1998).
92. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
UNTS 3; Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12; The Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66–
67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) (stating “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.”).  The principle was amplified ten years later in a declaration stat-
ing,
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination enshrined in the Char-
ter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine without exter-
nal interference their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the
provisions of this Charter.).
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).  These instruments also
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In the past, the UN focused on the importance of assimilating in-
digenous peoples into the communities of their respective countries.93
The UN  now recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to maintain
their own institutions, cultures and identities within the framework of
existing nations. 94
The International Labor Organization Convention on Indige-
nous and Tribal Peoples, Convention No. 169 of 1989 requires gov-
ernments to “develop co-ordinated and systematic action to protect
the rights” of indigenous peoples and “to guarantee respect for their
integrity.”95  Article 1 of the ILO Convention No. 169 recognizes that
indigenous groups are “tribal peoples in independent countries whose
social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other
sections of the national communities, and whose status is regulated
wholly or partially by their own cultural patterns, social institutions
and legal systems.”96
The granting of intellectual property rights to indigenous peoples
has been seen by states as a way to rectify their reluctance to allow for
indigenous self-governance.  The issue of indigenous intellectual
property rights has attracted attention on the international level.  This
approach elevates the role of comparative analysis, whether in devel-
oping substantive private international copyright law or in interpret-
ing the provisions of international treaties.  Two legal instruments
specifically advocate the increased recognition of indigenous intellec-
tual property rights: the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples and the Berne Convention.  Both advocate for
stronger rights than are currently available in either the United States
or Australia.
1. The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples.  In 1989, the UN Working Group on Indigenous
Populations began composing a UN Draft Declaration on the Rights
conveyed that the right could not be exercised in a manner that could undermine the territorial
integrity of independent and democratic states that conducted themselves in accordance with
international human rights standards.
93. Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (No. 107) [hereinafter Indigenous and
Tribal Populations Convention], June 26, 1957, ILO, available at http://www.ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/
cgi-lex/convde.pl?c107 (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
94. International Labour Conference, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (June 27, 1989) (entered into force
Sep. 5, 1990) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169].
95. Id. pt. I, art. 2.
96. Id. art. 1.
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of Indigenous Peoples.  By 1993, the UN Draft Declaration had been
formulated to address indigenous cultural, economic, social and land
rights.97  The UN Draft Declaration was submitted to the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR), which in 1995 organized an inter-sessional
working group to review the text.98  The General Assembly has not
yet ratified the UN Draft Declaration, and the UN member states are
currently considering the draft.99
The UN Draft Declaration establishes a comprehensive right to
self-determination.  Article 8 of the UN Draft Declaration states that
indigenous people are to have the collective and individual right to
identify themselves as indigenous and to be recognized as such. 100
Article 3 of the UN Draft Declaration states that “indigenous
peoples have the right of self-determination” which includes the right
to freely determine their political status and the ability to pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.101  The standards for self-
governance “are regarded as the necessary minimum to safeguard the
cultural diversity represented by indigenous peoples.”102  Article 12 of
the UN Draft Declaration states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their
cultural traditions and customs.  This includes the right to maintain,
protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of
their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts,
designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts
and literature, as well as the right to the restitution of cultural, in-
tellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free
97. Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Eleventh Session,
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., An-
nex I., Agenda Item 14, at 50–51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993) [hereinafter U.N.
Draft Declaration].  The U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities adopted the U.N. Draft Declaration in 1994.  The Draft Declaration was adopted
by its resolution 1994/45, Aug. 26, 1994, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, at 105
(1994).
98. Press Release, Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights Begins
Discussion of Indigenous Issues (Apr. 3, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/
1997/ 19970402. hrcn785.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2002).
99. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.
unhchr.ch/indigenous/ main.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002) (stating that “[t]his draft declaration
on the rights of indigenous peoples is currently working its way up through the U.N. system to
the General Assembly, where it will be considered as an aspirational document for Nation
States and the Indigenous peoples of the world.”).
100. Id.
101. U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 97, art. 3.
102. Id.
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and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and
customs.103
Furthermore, Article 29 states “indigenous peoples are entitled to the
recognition of the full ownership, control and protection of their cul-
tural and intellectual property.”104  The UN Draft Declaration lan-
guage also provides for the ability of indigenous peoples to maintain
past and future manifestations of their cultural and spiritual property.
This language is similar to the rights of integrity recognized in an in-
tellectual property “moral rights” scheme, which allows for the artist
to manage the use of his expressions, regardless of ownership.105  In
contrast to intellectual property regimes in Western countries, how-
ever, the UN Draft Declaration uses language supporting communal
ownership.106
Indigenous peoples are hoping to use the UN Draft Declaration
to seek recognition for and application of their unique value systems
within the legal systems of their residential states.107  The states, on
the other hand, have been reluctant to cede control over segments of
their population, especially in regards to granting indigenous self-rule.
Consequently, defining the scope of self-determination has proven to
be highly controversial.108  According to Erica-Irene A. Daes, Chair-
person of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations:
[G]overnments have remained sceptical regarding the right to self-
determination of Indigenous Peoples . . . a majority of governments
have continued to express fear and uncertainty about self-
determination, and, in particular, about Article 3 of the UN Draft
Declaration.  This fear and uncertainty by governments regarding
this important and multifarious point has been the main factor de-
103. Id. art. 12.
104. Id. art. 29.
105. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 99–27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), Art. 15(4).  See Part III.B.2. infra.
106. “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous commu-
nity or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation con-
cerned.  No disadvantage of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right.”  U.N. Draft
Declaration, supra note 97, art. 9.  “Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right
to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to iden-
tify themselves as indigenous and to be recognized as such.”  Id. art. 8.
107. Alison Quentin-Baxter, The International and Constitutional Law Contexts, in
RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 4 (Alison Quentin-Baxter ed., 1998).
108. See U.N. Rights: U.N. Still at Odds over Indigenous Rights, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec.
14, 1998.
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laying the completion of the elaboration of the draft declara-
tion . . . .109
It is therefore unlikely that a sufficient number of states will
adopt the UN Draft Declaration, thus preventing it from entering
into the corpus of customary international law.110
2. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Ar-
tistic Work.  The UN Draft Declaration alludes to many of the moral
rights contained in the Berne Convention, which explicitly recognizes
“moral rights” in intellectual property.  Moral rights include the
“right of publication,” the right to decide whether a work will be
made public, the “right of paternity,” the right to claim authorship,
the “right of integrity,” the right to object to distortions of the work
that would harm honor or reputation.111  Moral rights protect the dis-
tinctive qualities of created works, recognizing that “a painting or a
book is different from other kinds of property because of the in-
tensely personal nature of its creation.”112  The created work comes
from within the author and is a part of its creator.  The term “right of
paternity” indicates that such “moral rights” work is linked by a fam-
ily-like tie to its creator.113  Of all the moral rights, the right of integ-
rity is considered to offer the most potential to protect indigenous
creators.114
Unfortunately, moral rights pertain only in certain situations and
thus offer limited protection for indigenous peoples.  The resulting
copyright law is generally “ill-suited for adequately protecting folk-
lore” since the laws “recognize solely an individual author’s creative
expression as the authorship in a work and normally require fixation
of the work in a tangible medium before limited durations rights will
109. Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Concepts of Self-Determination and Autonomy of Indigenous
Peoples in the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 14 ST. TH.
L. REV. 259, 262 (2001).
110. Rosemary J. Coombe, Symposium, Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual
Property, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International
Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conversation of Biodiversity, 6
IND. J. GLOBAL STUD. 59, 83 (1998).
111. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 105.
112. Lenora Ledwon, Native American Life Stories and “Authorship”: Legal and Ethical Is-
sues, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 78 (1996).
113. Id.
114. Banks, supra note 87, at 337.
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vest.”115  This position is further complicated by the fact that most in-
digenous folklore is communal in nature and not necessarily fixed in a
tangible medium of embodiment.
B. Copyright Conflicts and Partial Solutions: The Effects of
International Instruments in the United States and Australia
The UN Draft Declaration and the Berne Convention have both
produced responses in the United States and Australia.  These two
countries, however, have responded differently.  The next section de-
scribes the varying approaches to expanding indigenous intellectual
property rights in the United States and Australia.
1. Barriers: Copyright Law Conflicts.  Six problems come be-
tween American copyright law and indigenous intellectual property
rights: (a) Individual authorship, (b) Originality, (c) Public domain,
(d) Duration, (e) Fixation, and (f) Fair use.
a. Individual Authorship.  In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the “author” as “[h]e to
whom anything owes its origin; originator, maker.”116  This conception
of authorship reflects the “Romantic archetype” of the author, which:
[H]as lent to copyright doctrine a conception of the author as lone
genius, whose work breaks from tradition and does not receive in-
creased importance or validity through connections to prior crea-
tions . . . . The resulting definition of authorship exists in direct op-
position to the communal methods of creativity symbolizing the
structure of Native communities, which place the origins of tribal
works in the group, not the individual.  The demonization of in-
digenous works as communitarian has further pushed collective
creativity outside the Western, capitalistic legal infrastructure.117
Western definitions of authorship are thus in tension with indigenous
communal works.  U.S. copyright law is premised on individual rights
for the individual creator.  In contrast, indigenous artistic creations
“defy the concept of individual authorship, because the sanctity of the
work itself derives, in part, from the import placed on the collective
creation of the piece.”118  In indigenous societies, the group product is
115. Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural Prop-
erty, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 315–16 (1994).
116. 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
117. Riley, supra note 4, at 191.
118. Id. at 194.
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“the medium through which all tribal members, living, dead and un-
born, speak their voice and become a part of the tribal way.”119  In-
digenous artwork thus cannot fit into the constraints of western indi-
vidual authorship.
b. Originality.  U.S. copyright law requires originality for pro-
tection to subsist.120  Yet most indigenous folklore is ancient and
evolving.  Originality is contrary to Native American traditions of
passing ancestral teachings from generation to generation.  Original-
ity thus blocks protection of such folklore.
c. Public Domain.  Much of the indigenous material has been
around for hundreds, if not thousands, of years.  The material is thus
already in the public domain and could therefore not be protected
under American copyright law.
d. Duration.  Existing copyright law provides protection for a
limited period of time.121  After this period, the work passes into the
public domain and can be freely used without permission from the
creator or artist.  Indigenous peoples are seeking perpetual rights for
their religious and cultural work.  This type of infinite protection is
inconsistent with the limited terms of western copyright law.
e. Fixation.  American copyright law also requires fixation in a
tangible medium of embodiment.122  Fixation is not conducive to tradi-
tional forms of indigenous culture, which is primarily oral and expres-
sive.  By their very nature, most indigenous songs, myths, stories, cus-
toms and other expressions, are not in transcribed form.
119. Id.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002) (providing that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.” (emphasis added)).
121. Id. § 302(a) (providing that a “[c]opyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978,
subsists from its creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70
years after the author’s death.”).  See also id. § 302(c) (providing that “[i]n the case of an
anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire, the copyright endures for a
term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years the year of its crea-
tion, whichever expires first.”).
122. Under the Copyright Act: “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.”  Id. § 101 (2002).
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f. Fair Use.  The fair use exception in U.S. copyright law would
also pose problems to indigenous intellectual property.  Under
American law, copyrighted works can be used for educational pur-
poses, commentary and news information.123  Yet certain types of in-
digenous work cannot be shared outside of the community for relig-
ious and/or cultural reasons.  Secrecy is an integral part of the sacred
nature of indigenous artwork.  Accordingly, “many indigenous peo-
ples consider certain objects, as well as certain knowledge, limited
goods that cannot be shared and disseminated without a correspond-
ing loss in power, significance, and meaning.  Thus, certain objects
and information must remain concealed from the uninitiated either
within or outside the cultural group.”124  There has already been much
controversy over the use of certain indigenous artifacts in public mu-
seums.
To summarize, the six copyright law conflicts show that U.S.
copyright law does not protect tribal expressions because they lack
identifiable authorship.  Tribal expressions further require perpetual
protection, which also conflicts with the limitations on term protec-
tion for fixed expressions under the U.S. copyright law.  Additionally,
U.S. intellectual property law does not bestow tribes, as opposed to
individual artisans, with intellectual property rights.  Nor does it allow
intellectual property protection for expressions created beyond the
last century.  U.S. intellectual property law also fails to provide rights
of integrity and attribution for a broad category of fixed expres-
sions.125  These deficiencies limit the ability of Native Americans to
protect the cultural and spiritual integrity of their tribal heritage, as
they cannot limit the exploitation of their cultural and spiritual works
under U.S. copyright law.  Native Americans are also unable to real-
ize the potential economic benefit of managing the creation and trade
of their cultural and spiritual works.126
123. Id. § 107 (2002).
124. Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291, 314
(1999).
125. David B. Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual Property Law
and Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can it Fit?, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 93, 113
(2001).
126. Id. at 113–14.
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D. Partial Solutions
1. Australia.  Unsurprisingly, similar conflicts appear in the
Australian approach to intellectual property law.  A thorough review
of the limitations would be repetitive, and it can be stated simply that
Australian copyright law presents similar challenges to indigenous
peoples due to the requirements of individual authorship, originality,
public domain, duration, and fixation.  Like the United States, Aus-
tralia has been reluctant to adopt the robust language of the UN
Draft Declaration.127  However, unlike the United States, Australia
has been more welcoming to the provisions of the Berne Convention.
To an extent, moral rights are now recognized in Australia.
The Copyright Amendment Act of 2000128 includes a moral rights
regime in Australia for filmmakers and authors of literary, dramatic,
musical and artistic works in which copyright subsists. 129  The Act con-
tains only two moral rights: (1) the right of integrity (i.e., the right to
object to derogatory treatment of one’s work that may prejudicially
affect one’s reputation), and (2) the right of attribution (i.e., the right
to be identified as the author of the work).  Despite this expansion of
moral rights in Australia, indigenous peoples still face problems
similar to those posed under U.S. law.  The rights provided by the
Australian Act are only conferred to individuals, and thus indigenous
peoples would still face problems claiming protection for their com-
munal works.  Thus, moral rights pose aboriginals with the same
problem: the need to recognize an individual, “Romantic” author.130
In addition, the right of integrity has a limited duration—life of the
creator plus 50 years.131  The works would eventually fall into the
public domain, thus presenting further problems for advocates of in-
digenous intellectual property rights, who seek protection in perpetu-
ity for indigenous religious works.  Australia’s solution has been to
work through the courts as described in Part II.B.  The United States,
however, has chosen to enact limited federal legislation.
127. Heather S. Archer, Effect of United Nations Draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights on
Current Policies of Member States, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 205, 229–30 (1999).
128. Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 (Austl.).
129. Id.
130. See Jaszi, supra note 4, at 497 (“The connection between ‘moral rights’ and the complex
values associated with the Romantic conception of ‘authorship’ is clear”).
131. Copyright Act 1968 § 33 (Austl.).
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2. The United States.  The UN Draft Declaration and the Berne
Convention contain provisions that American copyright law fails to
provide.132  The United States has refused to adopt the UN Draft
Declaration, primarily due to the strong provisions on self-
determination for indigenous peoples.  Although the United States is
a party to the Berne Convention, it has ratified the Convention in
such a way that minimizes its effect on current American intellectual
property law.133
a. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act.
Due to the United States’ strong personal property and capitalist
roots, American law is ill equipped to address the unique cultural and
economic interests of Native American tribes.  Attempts have been
made to change this situation, though the progression in the United
States is slow and careful.  The Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA)134 was enacted as a re-
sponse to issues raised in Chilkat, which are to “protect Native
American burial sites and the removal of human remains, funerary
objects, sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony on Federal,
Indian, and Native Hawaiian lands.”135  The Act applies to both the
removal of cultural objects already on federal or tribal lands and to
objects in museums or federal agencies, including universities.  The
Act thus allows Native American Indian tribes to reclaim these cul-
tural objects.
NAGPRA was enacted, in part, to counter the appropriation of
indigenous religious items.  Western museums and “New Age” ad-
herents have created a market for the “culture theft” of Indian prayer
pies, drums, flutes and even Native American ceremonies.136  To tradi-
tional Native American spiritual authorities, this selling of religion is
132. The U.N. Draft Declaration recognizes a right of self-determination for indigenous
peoples, while the Berne Convention recognizes “moral rights” in intellectual property.  Com-
pare U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 97, art. 3, 12 with Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 105, art. 15, ¶ 4.
133. The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 (implementing Berne Con-
vention), extends protection to building design.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).  Protection does not
extend to individual standards features, such as common windows or other staple building com-
ponents.
134. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (1990).
135. H.R. Rep. No. 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4367.
136. Ledwon, supra note 112, at 76.
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“akin to having holy communion served at McDonalds.”137
NAGPRA “speaks specifically to the issue of illicit trade in certain
tribal artifacts and demonstrates an implied recognition of communal
property rights in cultural objects, but appears structurally unpre-
pared to enforce those rights.”138  As a result, many of the negotia-
tions for the reclamation and protection of cultural objects might take
place privately, in the form of alternative dispute resolution.  Since
such settlements would not occur in the courts, there would be little
creation of legal precedent.  Thus, while the settlements could satisfy
the parties to particular disputes, the lack of precedent might prove
detrimental to future Native American concerns, particularly if there
is a backlash to Indian cultural rights.
b. Indian Arts and Craft Act.  Since NAGPRA applies only to
“objects,”139 no federal law protects Indian control over the intangi-
bles associated with cultural ceremonies, such as symbols.  The Indian
Arts and Crafts Act gives the federal Indian Arts and Crafts Board
authority to create distinctive trademarks for Indian tribes and indi-
vidual Indian arts, and prohibits the misrepresentation of tangibles as
“Indian-made.”140  Individuals who become commercial artists or sell
handicrafts without meeting blood-quantum criteria may be subject to
penalties for claiming to be “Indian.”141
Traditional Indian custodians of cultural knowledge cannot use
copyright laws to protect their privacy, since copyright only applies to
new works by individual authors, not to old collective traditions or
“folklore.”142  Current U.S. copyright law fails to address the cultural
137. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 24, 1993).
138. Byren, supra note 70, at 111.
139. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)–(d) (1994).
140. See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2 (2000) (defining “Indian product”).  Most Indian tribes retain
“blood quantum” criteria for membership.  Federal officials originally inserted minimum blood
quantum criteria in tribal constitutions in the 1930s, as a way of limited federal expenditures on
newly “reorganized” Indian communities.  Russel L. Barsh, Symposium, Fifth Annual Tribal
Sovereignty Symposium, Grounded Visions: Native American Conceptions of Landscapes and
Ceremony, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 127, 139 (2000).  Indian tribes have the authority to elimi-
nate blood quantum criteria, but very few tribes have done so.  See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–56 (1978) (establishing Indian tribes’ broad power to control their
membership).  Tribes support this practice today as a legitimate test of eligibility to share in
tribal assets and services.  Yet blood quantum is arguably unjust as a limitation on individuals’
rights to practice their religion and draw upon their own cultural traditions as artists.  Barsh,
supra at 139.
141. Barsh, supra note 140, at 152.
142. Id. at 141.
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and economic concerns of Native American tribes.  American intel-
lectual property law has been criticized as lacking respect for the
moral rights of artists, limiting protection for authors as a market
growth incentive, and valuing copyright as a welfare tax on the public
instead of a private right of the authors.143  Despite international sup-
port for granting indigenous peoples’ moral rights, the United States
has been reluctant to provide additional protection to the intellectual
property of Native American tribes.144
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Intellectual property law as it stands is not sufficient to fully pro-
tect and respect indigenous cultural beliefs.  International instru-
ments, most notably the UN Draft Declaration and the Berne Con-
vention, propose language that would satisfy indigenous concerns.
However, countries like the United States and Australia are reluctant
to adopt such provisions in full force.  Instead, these countries are
slowly expanding indigenous intellectual property rights, though in
different ways.
A fundamental tension between Western ideals of individuality
and indigenous communal beliefs gives rise to problems in both
American and Australian laws.  The very expression “intellectual
property rights” makes it appear as if the property and the rights are
products of individual minds.  “This is part of a Western epistemology
that separates mind from body, subject from object, observer from
observed and that accords priority, control, and power to the first half
of the duality.  The term ‘intellectual’ connotes as well the knowledge
side and suggests that context of use is unimportant.”145  Many indige-
nous peoples view intellectual property rights as “Western” in that
they are foreign, threatening, and exploitative of indigenous beliefs.146
They see intellectual property rights as a “new form of colonization”
and “a tactic by the industrialized countries of the North to confuse
and to divert the struggle of indigenous peoples from their rights to
land and resources on, above, and under it.”147  Thus, the very notion
143. Jordan, supra note 125, at 114–15.
144. Id.
145. Stephen Gudeman, Sketches, Qualms, and Other Thoughts on Intellectual Property
Rights, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 103 (S.B. Brush & D. Stabinsky eds., 1996).
146. Coombe, supra note 110, at 79.
147. POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 2, at 219–20.
GRAD (FIXED).DOC 03/20/03  2:21 PM
2003] INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 231
of intellectual property is contrary to indigenous perceptions of com-
munal property.
Subsequently, perhaps intellectual property is not the solution to
improving the status and rights of indigenous peoples.  Quite possibly,
molding the Chilkat, the Ganalbingu or the Galpu decisions into pro-
tection for “Romantic” authors is contrary to indigenous beliefs.
Bulun Bulun may not want to be Goethe, that is, Bulun Buln may not
want the individual recognition and remuneration accorded to
Goethe through Western intellectual property law.  Bulun Bulun may
just want the freedom to practice his religious beliefs and to exercise
his tribal responsibilities, without fearing that his work will be repro-
duced on carpets or currency.  Because of their origins in the Western
tradition of protection for individual intellectual property rights, the
laws of Australia, the United States, and the international community
may not be sufficient to ensure respect for indigenous peoples and
their culture.
The recent court decisions in Australia show a willingness of the
courts to modify the law to accommodate indigenous beliefs.  In the
United States, the courts have been unwilling to expand the law in the
manner of Australian courts.  Nonetheless, the U.S. legislature has re-
sponded to perceived injustices of American law toward Native
Americans.  NAGPRA was enacted as a response to the Chilkat case.
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act further expanded indigenous intellec-
tual property rights.  Thus, through the courts in Australia, and the
enacting of federal legislation in the United States, indigenous people
are slowly gaining stronger recognition of their intellectual property
rights.  Though current inequities still exist between indigenous peo-
ples and other members of society, both the United States and Aus-
tralia appear to be attempting to rectify past wrongs through the
granting of expanded legal intellectual property rights.
Rachael Grad
